Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/113961 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 60.2015
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium harvest strategies are non-linear in stock and find that Grand Coalitions can be stable for any number of players if free-riding results in a total depletion of the fish stock. The results thus show conditions under which a Great Fish War becomes a Great Fish Pact. However, this conclusion no longer holds upon dropping the standard assumption that payoffs are evaluated in steady states. If payoffs in the transition between steady states are included, the increased incentives to deviate offset the increased benefits from cooperation due to the presence of endogenous risk and the Great Fish Pact returns to being a Great Fish War.
Schlagwörter: 
Coalition Stability
Dynamic Games
Endogenous Risk
Fish Stock Collapse
Fish War
Renewable Resource Exploitation
JEL: 
C72
C73
Q22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.54 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.