Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/113958 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 57.2015
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.
Schlagwörter: 
Bipartite Graph
Public Good
Nash Equilibrium
Non-Linear
Complementarity Problem
JEL: 
C72
D85
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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