Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113958
Authors: 
Rébillé, Yann
Richefort, Lionel
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 57.2015
Abstract: 
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.
Subjects: 
Bipartite Graph
Public Good
Nash Equilibrium
Non-Linear
Complementarity Problem
JEL: 
C72
D85
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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