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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5352
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The research on earnings determination is based on the Mincer-Becker assumption that individuals decide on schooling by maximizing income. This paper offers an alternative and less restrictive approach based on utility maximization. Using this approach, we analyze the efficiency of education policy in Ramsey’s tradition. Distortive wage taxation is shown to provide an efficiency reason for subsidizing education in effective terms. Second-best policy is confronted with empirical evidence for OECD countries.
Schlagwörter: 
schooling choice and earnings functions
utility vs. earnings maximization
power law of learning
second-best taxation in Ramsey’s tradition
empirical evidence
JEL: 
J24
H21
I28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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