Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113174
Authors: 
Thum, Marcel P.
Konrad, Kai
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Environmental Economics I A13-V4
Abstract: 
When politicians negotiate in international climate conventions they may suffer from incomplete information about each other's preferences about reaching an agreement. As is known, this may cause failure to reach an efficient cooperative agreement. We study the role of the clean development mechanism (CDM) for the likelihood of such failure. The CDM has been introduced in the context of the Kyoto Protocol to allow countries to make efficiency enhancing use of cross-country low- cost mitigation opportunities. We use a simple bargaining framework to uncover why this mechanism may reduce the likelihood for reaching an efficient cooperative climate agreemen
JEL: 
Q54
Q58
H41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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