Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113149
Authors: 
Wenzel, Tobias
Normann, Hans-Theo
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Industrial Organization II B11-V2
Abstract: 
We explore how competition affects firms obfuscation strategies in laboratory experiments. Firms sell a base good and an add-on product. The price of the add-on may be shrouded and, if so, myopic consumers pay too much. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiments, competition matters in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas fourfirm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.
JEL: 
L40
L41
C90
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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