Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113110
Authors: 
Siemroth, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Economic Theory A20-V3
Abstract: 
A policy maker (PM) needs information that only financial market traders know in order to implement his optimal policy, and traders may aggregate this information in asset prices. In such a setting, prices can become uninformative, because the PM reacts to information contained in prices, thereby changing asset values and possibly punishing traders for revealing the information. I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of fully revealing and accurate prices in large financial markets. Non-fulfillment of this condition means prices cannot be informationally efficient. The condition is also necessary and sufficient for the existence of fully revealing REE, and explains results from several applications in the literature. The condition implies that assets whose values are invertible in the underlying are superior in terms of information revelation compared to assets whose values are non-invertible.
JEL: 
D84
G10
D53
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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