Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112998
Authors: 
Boom, Anette
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Procurement F14-V2
Abstract: 
Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market, this paper examines the effect of price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. General bid caps reduce the maximum price below the bid cap, but also the minimum potential market price below the cap. A bid cap only for the larger firms does not guarantee a market price below the cap. A sufficiently high bid floor only for relatively small firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably larger bid floors.
JEL: 
D44
D43
L13
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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