Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112944
Authors: 
Günther, Michael
Hellmann, Tim
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Modelling Energy Markets and Pollution F17-V2
Abstract: 
Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution eff ects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which are simple and invariant to renegotiation. Our main contribution to the literature on IEAs is that we allow for heterogeneous patterns of pollution such that additional to a global eff ect of pollution there are local pollution e ffects represented by a network structure. We show that stable IEAs exist if the network structure is balanced. Too large asymmetries in the degree of local spillovers may however lead to non-existence of stable structures.
JEL: 
C72
D85
Q50
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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