Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112884
Authors: 
Neugart, Michael
Kemmerling, Achim
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Public Sector Economics and Developing Countries E14-V2
Abstract: 
Pension schemes that redistribute money to the elderly have seen a remarkable surge in developing countries. To explain this phenomenon we build a political economy model of a Beveridgean pay-as-you-go social security system which incorporates family transfers driven by costs of non-compliance to a social norm. For appropriately chosen weights of a political support function a government will choose to increase pensions if the share of the urban population increases, productivity differentials between urban and rural workers widen, or if the social norm erodes.
JEL: 
H55
D72
O18
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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