Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112870
Authors: 
Fenge, Robert
Wrede, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Children 1 E07-V1
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the e ects of asymmetric information between parents and child care centers about the quality of child care. In a dynamic game of incomplete information the child care center sends a signal about its child care quality. The parents cannot observe the true quality. By updating the information the parents decide whether they enforce high quality. We consider policy measures to increase the ex-post probability of high quality. Some measures turn out to have negative e ects on ex-post quality. Furthermore, we determine the welfare in the perfect Bayesian equilibria and the welfare-maximizing e ort to increase the probability of high quality.
JEL: 
J13
C73
D19
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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