Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112784
Authors: 
Gu, Yiquan
Wenzel, Tobias
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 192
Abstract: 
The paper reports the results of an experiment where asymmetric sellers of a product can obfuscate the market. We show that policy measures may have unintended effects of increasing obfuscation incentives. We find that policies that limit the effectiveness of obfuscation and policies that promote parity between firms can lead less prominent firms to increase their obfuscation efforts. Despite this unintended effect, however, the former type of policies is effective in boosting consumer welfare.
Subjects: 
Experiment
Obfuscation
Consumer Protection
Behavioural Industrial Organisation
JEL: 
C91
D18
D43
L13
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-191-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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