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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2015-54
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers a general symmetric quantity-setting oligopoly where the "coefficient of cooperation" defined by Cyert and DeGroot (An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context, 1973) is interpreted as the parameter indicating severity of competition. It is obtained that horizontal mergers are more likely to be profitable in a more competitive market structure. Consequently, the results by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, 1983) about merger profitability are sensitive to the assumption of pre-merger Cournot competition.
Schlagwörter: 
oligopoly
competitive intensity
horizontal mergers
JEL: 
L13
L40
L41
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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