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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 15-071/II
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment studying the role of asymmetries, both in payoffs and recognition probabilities, in a model of strategic bargaining with Condorcet cycles. Overall, we find only limited support for the equilibrium predictions. The main deviations from theory are: a) Subjects under-exploit their bargaining power by being more accommodating in their acceptance decision than predicted; b) subjects’ change in behavior in reaction to asymmetric recognition probabilities exhibits systematic deviations from theory. This suggests that subjects do not fully grasp the subtle effects asymmetries have on bargaining power, especially when the asymmetries relate to recognition probabilities.
Schlagwörter: 
Bargaining
Condorcet Paradox
Experiments
Voting
Committees
JEL: 
C73
C78
C91
C92
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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