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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 15-054/I
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors’ actions on cartel stability and firms’ incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe that the extra profits that firms obtain thanks to the possibility to communicate are higher when individualized information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation.
Schlagwörter: 
Cournot oligopoly
Cartels
Information
Experiments
JEL: 
C92
L13
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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