Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111439
Authors: 
Aytimur, R. Emre
Bruns, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research 252
Abstract: 
We show that a large electorate of ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive very noisy signals about her performance. We find that the accountability problem can be solved well in the sense that the incumbent exerts effort as if she faced a social planner who receives a perfect signal about her performance. Our results thus shed light on another potential blessing of large electorates in addition to information aggregation as postulated by the jury theorem.
Subjects: 
accountability
elections
information
jury theorem
JEL: 
D72
D82
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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