Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/111243 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 186
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers rent-seeking games in which a small percentage change in a player's bid has a large percentage impact on her odds of winning, i.e., on the ratio of her respective probabilities of winning and losing. An example is the Tullock contest with a high R. The analysis provides a fairly complete characterization of the equilibrium set. In particular, for "sufficiently generic" valuations, any equilibrium of the rent-seeking game is shown to be both payoff- and revenue-equivalent to the first-price all-pay auction. For general valuations, the analysis establishes a robustness property of the all-pay auction.
Schlagwörter: 
Rent-seeking games
mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium
robustness of the all-pay auction
Tullock contest
JEL: 
C72
D45
D72
L12
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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