Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111243
Authors: 
Ewerhart, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 186
Abstract: 
This paper considers rent-seeking games in which a small percentage change in a player's bid has a large percentage impact on her odds of winning, i.e., on the ratio of her respective probabilities of winning and losing. An example is the Tullock contest with a high R. The analysis provides a fairly complete characterization of the equilibrium set. In particular, for "sufficiently generic" valuations, any equilibrium of the rent-seeking game is shown to be both payoff- and revenue-equivalent to the first-price all-pay auction. For general valuations, the analysis establishes a robustness property of the all-pay auction.
Subjects: 
Rent-seeking games
mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium
robustness of the all-pay auction
Tullock contest
JEL: 
C72
D45
D72
L12
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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