Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111240
Authors: 
Kriss, Peter H.
Weber, Roberto A.
Xiao, Erte
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 185
Abstract: 
Prior research demonstrates a willingness to incur costs to punish norm violators. But, how strong are the motives underlying such acts? Will people rely on "excuses" to avoid acting on costly punishment intentions, as with other costly pro-social acts? In a laboratory experiment, we find that third parties punish reluctantly: they state a preference to punish, but avoid the opportunity when doing so does not reveal this as their preference. In contrast, second parties - those directly wronged - are resolute punishers: they actively seek out the opportunity to punish. Our findings highlight important differences in motives underlying second- and third-party punishment.
Subjects: 
Experiment
third-party punishment
second-party punishment
fairness
JEL: 
C72
C92
D64
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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