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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 184
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Optimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach. The present analysis relies instead on the construction of an "upper envelope" over all incentive compatibility conditions. lt turns out that the first-order approach is not innocuous. For example, in contrast to the traditional understanding, tournaments may be dominated by piece rates even if workers are risk-neutral. The paper also offers a strikingly simple characterization of the optimal tournament for quadratic costs and CARA utility, as well as an extension to large tournaments.
Schlagwörter: 
Rank-order tournaments
first-order approach
envelope theorem
JEL: 
C62
D86
L23
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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