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Autoren: 
Ewerhart, Christian
Datum: 
2014
Reihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper 168
Zusammenfassung: 
The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and professional forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for n ≥ 4 firms is characterized as the solution of a well-behaved boundary value problem. The analysis suggests that, in contrast to the cases n = 3 and n → ∞ , the equilibrium for a finite number of n ≥ 4 firms tends to overrepresent locations at the periphery of its support interval. Moreover, in the class of examples considered, an increase in the number of firms universally leads to a wider range of location choices and to a more dispersed distribution of individual locations. The results are used to comment on the potential benefit of competition in forecasting markets.
Schlagwörter: 
Location
Hotelling game
mixed-strategy equilibrium
boundary value problem
JEL: 
C72
D43
D72
L13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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