Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/111185 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 63 [rev.]
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.
Schlagwörter: 
learning in games
stochastic stability,
radius-coradius theorems
logit-response dynamics
mutations
imitation
JEL: 
C72
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
288.96 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.