Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111185
Authors: 
Ferrer-Alós, Carlos
Netzer, Nick
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 63 [rev.]
Abstract: 
A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.
Subjects: 
learning in games
stochastic stability,
radius-coradius theorems
logit-response dynamics
mutations
imitation
JEL: 
C72
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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