Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/111049 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel No. 556
Verlag: 
Universität Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the entrepreneur's and venture capitalist's effort, and the signals each player has revealed about his private information regarding the project's perspectives. This property can be used to induce both players to reveal their private information truthfully and to spend the efficient effort. This result holds irrespective of the assumed distribution function of the state of nature. The model is consistent with the observation that conversion is often automatic and that there is an inverse correlation between risk and control rights. Furthermore, it explains why venture capitalists can earn positive expected returns in a competitive venture capital market.
Schlagwörter: 
venture capital
moral hazard
adverse selection
signaling
JEL: 
D23
D82
G24
G32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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