Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110964 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1487
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Our market experiment investigates the extent to which traders learn from the price, differentiating between situations where orders are submitted before versus after the price has realized. When market participants have to submit their bids conditional on the price, they show a bias by reacting only to their private information and not to the hypothetical value of the price. In a sequential trading mechanism, where the price is known at the bid submission, bids react to price to an extent that is roughly consistent with the benchmark theory.
Schlagwörter: 
Naive Expectations
Asymmetric Information
Rational Expectations
Sequential Markets
JEL: 
D82
D81
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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