Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110893
Authors: 
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 187
Abstract: 
We analyze the welfare effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly if the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. We derive conditions such that otherwise price-increasing mergers become externality-free by the use of remedial divestitures. In this case, the consumer surplus standard ensures that mergers are only implemented if they increase social welfare. If the merging parties can extract the entire surplus from the asset sale, then the socially optimal buyer will be selected under a consumer standard.
Subjects: 
Remedies
Merger control
Consumer standard
Synergies
JEL: 
L13
L41
K21
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-186-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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