Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110798
Authors: 
Kovenock, Dan J.
Roberson, Brian
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5291
Abstract: 
In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game and the Colonel Blotto game to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium in the generalized version of the General Lotto game and then show how this characterization can be applied to identify equilibria in the Colonel Blotto version of the game. In both games, we find that there exist sets of non-pathological parameter configurations of positive Lebesgue measure with multiple payoff nonequivalent equilibria.
Subjects: 
Colonel Blotto game
General Lotto game
multi-battle contest
redistributive politics
all-pay auction
JEL: 
C72
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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