Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110608 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 138
Verlag: 
Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Leipzig
Zusammenfassung: 
Against the backdrop of a growing national and international accountability movement in education outcomes, this study sets up a simple model of yardstick competition with incumbent-disciplining effects through voters comparing performance measures of public education both across nations and federal states. It implies a potential strategic dilemma where a single top-performance state can block reform measures that could benefit low-performance states more than would do for itself. The linchpin predictions of the model are tested by analyzing announcement effects of student achievement tests on vote and popularity (VP) functions of German national and state government incumbents.
Schlagwörter: 
yardstick competition
public education
VP-functions
JEL: 
H75
H77
I28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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