Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110608
Authors: 
Mandel, Philipp
Süßmuth, Bernd
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 138
Abstract: 
Against the backdrop of a growing national and international accountability movement in education outcomes, this study sets up a simple model of yardstick competition with incumbent-disciplining effects through voters comparing performance measures of public education both across nations and federal states. It implies a potential strategic dilemma where a single top-performance state can block reform measures that could benefit low-performance states more than would do for itself. The linchpin predictions of the model are tested by analyzing announcement effects of student achievement tests on vote and popularity (VP) functions of German national and state government incumbents.
Subjects: 
yardstick competition
public education
VP-functions
JEL: 
H75
H77
I28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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