Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110400
Authors: 
Ketelaar, Felix
Szalay, Dezsö
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 487
Abstract: 
We study a tractable two-dimensional model of price discrimination. Consumers combine a rigid with a more flexible choice, such as choosing the location of a house and its quality or size. We show that the optimal pricing scheme involves no bundling if consumer types are affiliated. Conversely, if consumer types are negatively affiliated over some portion of types then some bundling occurs.
Subjects: 
Price discrimination
Bundling
Monopoly
Multidimensional screening
JEL: 
D42
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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