Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110396
Authors: 
Wuggenig, Mirjam
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 485
Abstract: 
The paper analyzes a dynamic model of rational strategic learning in a network. It complements existing literature by providing a detailed picture of short-run dynamics in a game of strategic experimentation where agents are located in a social network. We show that the delay in information transmission caused by incomplete network structures may induce players to increase own experimentation efforts. As a consequence a complete network can fail to be optimal even if there are no costs for links. This means that in the design of networks there exists a trade-off between the speed of learning and accuracy.
Subjects: 
Strategic Experimentation
Networks
Learning
JEL: 
C73
D83
D85
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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