Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110274
Authors: 
Hollmayr, Josef
Kühl, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Deutsche Bundesbank 07/2015
Abstract: 
In this paper, we discuss the consequences of imperfect information about financial frictions on the macroeconomy. We rely on a New Keynesian DSGE model with a banking sector in which we introduce imperfect information about a limited enforcement problem. Bank managers divert resources and can increase the share of diversion. This can only be observed imperfectly by depositors. The ensuing imperfect information generates a higher volatility of the business cycle. Spillovers from the financial sector to the real economy are higher and shocks in general are considerably amplified in the transition period until agents' learning is complete. Volatility and second-order moments also display an amplification under the learning setup compared with the rational expectations framework.
Subjects: 
DSGE Model
Financial Frictions
Learning
JEL: 
E3
E44
G3
ISBN: 
978-3-95729-135-6
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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