Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110266 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IMFS Working Paper Series No. 91
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
Our paper evaluates recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent setting, in which the agent exerts effort for an immediately observable task (acquisition) and a task for which information is only gradually available over time (diligence). Optimal compensation contracts trade off the cost and benefit of delay resulting from agent impatience and the informational gain. Mandatory deferral may increase or decrease equilibrium diligence depending on the importance of the acquisition task. We provide concrete conditions on economic primitives that make mandatory deferral socially (un)desirable.
Schlagwörter: 
financial regulation
compensation design
principal-agent models
JEL: 
G28
G21
D86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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