Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/110155
Authors: 
Pichler, Stefan
Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 8850
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a test for the existence and the degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior. Then we derive testable conditions for reduced shirking, increased presenteeism, and the level of overall moral hazard when benefits are cut. We implement the test empirically exploiting German sick pay reforms and administrative industry-level data on certified sick leave by diagnoses. The labor supply adjustment for contagious diseases is significantly smaller than for non-contagious diseases, providing evidence for contagious presenteeism and negative externalities which arise in form of infections.
Subjects: 
sickness insurance
sick pay
presenteeism
contagious diseases
infections
negative externalities
shirking
JEL: 
I12
I13
I18
J22
J28
J32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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