Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/110148 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 8879
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Attorneys elected to the US Congress and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law than legislators with a different professional background. This finding is based on the analysis of 64 roll call votes at the federal and state level between 1995 and 2014. It holds when controlling for legislators' ideology and is particularly strong for term-limited lawyer-legislators. The empirical regularity is consistent with the hypothesis that lawyer-legislators, at least in part, pursue their private interests when voting on tort issues. Our results highlight the relevance of legislators' identities and individual professional interests for economic policy making.
Schlagwörter: 
lawyers
legislatures
rent-seeking
tort law
tort reform
voting behavior
JEL: 
D72
K13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
675.49 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.