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Autor:innen: 
Apreda, Rodolfo
Datum: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 535
Verlag: 
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA), Buenos Aires
Zusammenfassung: 
Firstly, this paper brings forth an encompassing definition of investment funds intended to track down some patterns of deviant governance. Secondly, it will focus on three conspicuous types among those funds: banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds. Such approach seeks to reveal deep similarities among them, albeit they may superficially look dissimilar. Afterwards, hinging upon the notion of opaque governance, we point out that investment funds more often than not misapply special purpose vehicles, in particular the so-called collateralized-debt obligations, just to hide their transactions, debasing their transparency, flouting good practices, even showing contempt of the law. Last of all, it will be put forward a protocol of covenants to be enforced by regulators on behalf of investors, taxpayers and financial markets.
Schlagwörter: 
investment funds
banks
mutual funds
hedge funds
corporate governance
opaque governance
JEL: 
F34
G01
G18
G30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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