Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109677
Authors: 
Bonanno, Giacomo
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, University of California, Department of Economics 14-1
Abstract: 
In Bonanno (Int. J. Game Theory, 42:567-592, 2013) a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) was introduced for extensive-form games and shown to be intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed notion is the existence of a plausibility order on the set of histories that rationalizes a given assessment. In this paper we study restrictions on the belief revision policy encoded in a plausibility order and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a PBE to be a sequential equilibrium.
Subjects: 
plausibility order
belief revision
Bayesian updating
independence
sequential equilibrium
consistency
JEL: 
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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