Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/109439 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 314
Verlag: 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Manila
Zusammenfassung: 
Can a government credibly promise not to bailout firms whose failure would have major negative systemic consequences? Our analysis of the Republic of Korea's 1997–1999 crisis, suggests an answer: No. Despite a general "no bailout" policy during the crisis, the largest Korean corporate groups (chaebol)―facing severe financial and governance problems―could still borrow heavily from households through issuing bonds at prices implying very low expected default risk. The evidence suggests "too big to fail" beliefs were not eliminated by government promises, presumably because investors believed that this policy was not time consistent. Subsequent government handling of potential and actual defaults by Daewoo and Hyundai confirmed the market view that creditors would be protected.
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