Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109377
Authors: 
D. Alba, Joseph
Park, Donghyun
Wang, Peiming
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ADB Economics Working Paper Series 202
Abstract: 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity is motivated by increasing shareholder value through improved corporate governance. Therefore, stronger corporate governance can reduce the returns from M&A activity, including M&A foreign direct investment (FDI). This, in turn, can reduce the returns from non-M&A FDI in light of the complementary relationship between M&A and non-M&A FDI. We use firm-level evidence to empirically examine the effect of corporate governance in the United States (US) on Japanese M&A and non-M&A FDI inflows. In doing so, we expand upon Alba, Park, and Wang (2009), which looked only at the M&A FDI inflows. We find that two landmark US corporate governance regulations help explain the sharp drop in both Japanese M&A and non-M&A FDI into the US during the 1990s. The regulations apparently encouraged US firms to improve their corporate governance. Our evidence thus suggests that corporate governance may affect both M&A and non-M&A FDI.
Subjects: 
Corporate governance
FDI
merger and acquisition
JEL: 
F21
F23
G30
G34
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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