Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/109212 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 180
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates the impact of four key economic variables on an expert firm's incentive to defraud its customers in a credence goods market: the level of competition, the expert firm's financial situation, its competence, and its reputational concerns. We use and complement the dataset of a nationwide field study conducted by the German Automobile Association that regularly checks the reliability of garages in Germany. We find that more intense competition and high competence lower a firm's incentive to overcharge. A low concern for reputation and a critical financial situation increase the incentive to overcharge.
Schlagwörter: 
Asymmetric information
Auto repair market
Credence goods
Expert
Fraud
Overcharging
JEL: 
D82
L15
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-179-3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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