Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/109044 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2014/14
Verlag: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Zusammenfassung: 
We model banks as profit-cum-utility maximizing firms and study, inter alia, bankers' incentives (optimal effort) and incentive driven productivity following deregulations. Our model puts to test a panel of Nepalese commercial banks which went through deep financial reforms in the recent past. We find that (i) bankers' efforts and productivity have notably improved in Nepal, (ii) bankers' efforts significantly explain the banking sector's productivity, (iii) the proportion of non-performing loans has considerably declined, and (iv) banking services have become costly, although the bank spread has moderately declined. Our approach is different from the widely used data envelopment analysis (DEA) of bank productivity, hence complements the literature. It also informs the current policy debate in Nepal where the Central Bank is seen to be geared towards regulating the financial system and micro-managing the banking institutions.
Schlagwörter: 
Reforms
incentives
productivity
panel integration
cointegration
simulation
JEL: 
G21
G28
O43
O53
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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