Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109039
Authors: 
Aytimur, R. Emre
Boukouras, Aristotelis
Schwager, Robert
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research 240
Abstract: 
We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates´ policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.
Subjects: 
elections
polarization
strategic delegation
bureaucracy
foreign influence
JEL: 
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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