Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108778
Authors: 
Greif, Avner
Tabellini, Guido
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5233
Abstract: 
Over the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines - analytically and historically - the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such loyalty groups influence institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Loyalty groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation.
JEL: 
N00
A10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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