Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108773
Authors: 
Mailath, George J.
Nocke, Volker
White, Lucy
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5225
Abstract: 
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator, but also to the nature of the deviation.
Subjects: 
simple penal code
subgame perfect equilibrium
repeated extensive game
optimal punishment
JEL: 
C70
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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