Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108754
Authors: 
Méango, Romuald
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Ifo Working Paper 187
Abstract: 
This paper develops and tests a model of profit-sharing arrangement over returns to a student migration investment. Taking advantage of a unique dataset on Cameroonian students, I find evidence of non-commitment bargaining between student, parents and an outside helper. The commitment problem arises because the coalition of parents and student has strong incentives not to abide by the outcome of the ex ante negotiation with the helper. This finding suggests some inefficiency of the decision process, in that students from credit-constrained families might not benefit from the support of a helper, even though the returns to their migration can be significant.
Subjects: 
Student migration
bargaining
commitment
JEL: 
C71
I25
J61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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