Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108662
Authors: 
Cao, Xiaoyong
Tan, Guofu
Tian, Guoqiang
Yilankaya, Okan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum Working Paper Series 1421
Abstract: 
We study equilibria in second price auctions when bidders are independently and privately informed about both their values and participation costs and their joint distributions across bidders are not necessarily identical. We show that there always exists an equilibrium in this general setting with two dimensional types of ex ante heterogeneous bidders. We provide conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Moreover, when the bidders are ex ante symmetric, we show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. We also identify sufficient conditions for existence of asymmetric equilibria.
Subjects: 
Two-Dimensional Types
Private Participation Costs
Second Price Auctions
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
JEL: 
C62
C72
D44
D61
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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