Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108639
Authors: 
Ertac, Seda
Gurdal, Mehmet Y.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum Working Paper Series 1324
Abstract: 
We report results from a laboratory experiment that explores the effects of preference communication and leader selection mechanisms in group decision-making. In a setting where all members of a group get the same payoff based on the group leader's decision of how much risk to take, we study the effects of two treatment variables: (1) whether group members can communicate their preferences to the leader, (2) whether the leader is exogenously appointed or voluntarily self-selects into the position. We find that the leader selection mechanism crucially affects the integration of group preferences into the leader's decision: the communicated preferences have a significant effect on the actual group decision only when the leader is appointed. We also find that preference communication by non-leaders is frequently strategic.
Subjects: 
group decision-making
risk
leadership
delegation
advice
information
experiments
JEL: 
C91
C92
D81
J16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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