Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108612
Authors: 
Saglam, Ismail
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum Working Paper Series 1232
Abstract: 
This paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are independent of the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1990a) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions relative to individual i are characterized by weak Pareto optimality and continuity together with two new axioms that depend on the pairwise total payoff asymmetry of the bargaining problem with respect to each pair involving individual i. Each of these solutions satisfies the basic symmetry axiom and also a stronger axiom called total payoff symmetry.
Subjects: 
Cooperative bargaining
proportional solutions
symmetry
JEL: 
C71
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.