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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2014-027
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions generate higher revenue.
Schlagwörter: 
auctions
collusion
espionage
laboratory experiments
JEL: 
C72
C91
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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