Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108362
Authors: 
Kóczy, László Á.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2014/31
Abstract: 
Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a model where players can reject certain partnerships in cooperation. For normalised indices strategic rejection may increase power. Our notion of a strategic power index is well defined if power is measured by an index that takes only minimal winning coalitions into account.
Subjects: 
quarrelling
rejected coalitions
a priori voting power
power indices
minimal winning coalitions
rational players
JEL: 
C71
D71
ISBN: 
978-615-5447-50-1
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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